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**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

WASHINGTON



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April 23, 1951

Proposed NIE on "Resistance of Burma to Insurgent Forces  
Assisted by Aid from Communist China in 1951"

There are indications that the Chinese Communists are in the process of implementing their agreement to provide military aid to the Burma Communist Party forces and are training Burmese insurgent cadres in Yunnan. Meanwhile, insurgent groups within Burma are increasing their military cooperation and taking the initiative against the Government. Traditional Chinese claims to Northern Burma, the absence of effective Burmese border defenses, the presence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma which might serve as a pretext for Chinese Communist action against Burma, and the increasing prospect of a unified insurgent action against the Government all contribute to growing apprehensions as to the ability of the Government of Burma to maintain itself against these threats.

These considerations suggest that an NIE should be prepared as a matter of urgency. Such an estimate might cover the following points:

1. Communist Intentions toward Burma.
2. Present Stage of Chinese Communist Plans and Operations for Military Assistance to Burmese Insurgents.
3. Chinese Communist Capabilities for Military Assistance to Insurgents in Burma.
  - a. Strength and disposition of Chinese Communist forces in Yunnan.
  - b. Availability of materiel for supplying Burmese insurgents.
  - c. Availability of transport and access to routes for supplying Burmese insurgents.
  - d. State of readiness of Burmese cadres training in Yunnan.
    - (1) Naw Seng forces
    - (2) Burmese Communist cadres
  - e. Potentialities of opposition forces in Yunnan to obstruct Chinese Communist operations and activities connected with aid to Burma.

4. Capacity

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4. Capacity of Burmese Insurgents to Utilize Chinese Communist Military Assistance.
  - a. Strength and disposition of insurgent forces in Burma.
  - b. Military aptitude and training.
  - c. Cooperation between insurgent groups.
  - d. Attitude of insurgent groups and local population toward Chinese Communist military assistance.
    - (1) Toward materiel aid
    - (2) Toward use Chinese Communist advisors
    - (3) Toward Chinese "Volunteers"
  - e. Potential strength of insurgent groups if supported by Chinese Communists.
  - f. Capabilities of insurgent forces to maintain strength until receipt of Chinese Communist aid.
5. Capabilities of Government of Burma Forces to Deal with Insurgents supported by Chinese Communist Military Assistance.
  - (1) Materiel aid
  - (2) Advisors
  - (3) Chinese "Volunteers"
6. Conclusions.

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Dr Langer -

Bill:

Herewith the Burma  
proposal I mentioned  
on phone.

Park

4/23